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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:

CRIMINAL LAW AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION.

By Jan Gorecki. New York: Columbia University Press. 1983. Pp.
x, 195. $26.
Jan Gorecki is a sociologist who approaches the field of criminal
law with a penchant for big ideas. In 1979, Gorecki wrote, Theory
of CriminalJustice,' a small but ambitious book that interprets punishment of criminals as a method of "persuasive instrumental learning" (Le., moral education) the primary purpose of which is to teach
not the criminal but the rest of society. Gorecki's new and equally
ambitious essay, CapitalPunishment, draws on the theoretical base
of his previous work as well as on a whirlwind survey of world history to evaluate the place of capital punishment in America's criminal law. Gorecki's conclusion is that capital punishment is destined
for the graveyard. There is, however, a major caveat to this conclusion: until our criminal justice system makes punishment for crime
more certain, the demise of capital punishment may be delayed.
Though Gorecki is obviously opposed to capital punishment, he
frames his essay in analytical rather than moralistic terms. Brief
summaries of the cultural and legal histories of Athens, Rome, and
modern Europe are used to support the thesis that "social evolution
brings a tendency toward decreasing severity of criminal punishments" (p. 3 1).2 As evolution progresses, moral aversion to wrongdoing "replaces fear as the main stimulus against harmful behavior"
(p. 75), so that harsh penalties become superfluous. Being superfluous, "harshness is perceived as infliction of unnecessary suffering by
a group of people who have increasingly learned not to harm others"
(p. 76).
Harshness is in fact harmful from the legal point of view, according to Gorecki, because it destroys the law's "persuasive moral
power" (p. 76).3 Furthermore, "[s]eeing inequitable punishment
may free incensed observers from self-censure of their own actions,
1. J. GoRcK, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1979) [hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL
JUSTICE].

2. Evolution, for Gorecki, is indicated by three simultaneous developments: advancement
and dissemination of knowledge, development and widening appreciation of the arts, and increasing socialization of the populace, as expressed in avoidance of destructive and aggressive
behavior and adoption of socially useful behavior patterns. Pp. 33-34.

3. A primary purpose of the law, Gorecki believes, is to "educate men in society by transforming legal prohibitions into moral norms." CRIMINAL JUSTICe, supra note 1, at 4. "The
is the indirect addressee - the society at
direct addressee is the criminal himself, but .... [i]t
large - that constitutes the proper audience for moral education through criminal sanctions."
Id at 22. For the system to work, punishment must be certain and must be perceived as just.
Id at 22-23. If these prerequisites are met, Gorecki believes, the members of society "acquire
moral experiences by process of vicarious learning - observation of criminals being punished
for their crimes." Id at 22.
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rather than prompting compliance, and thus increase transgressive
behavior" (p. 76). 4 This counterproductivity is not likely to go unnoticed if the society allows free expression. "The more democratic the
progressing society, the better the chance that the idea of reducing
the severity [of punishment] will win the minds and hearts of the
population and thus force the lawmakers to comply" (p. 78).
Ten years ago the death penalty seemed to be on the way out in
the United States, a trend consistent with Gorecki's evolutionary
model. In Furman v. Georgia,5 the Supreme Court declared that the
death penalty as imposed under the laws of Georgia and Texas constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. The Court was hardly of one mind (nine
opinions were written), but it was at least clear that the death penalty
would be subject to strict scrutiny in the future.
Four years after Furman, in Gregg v. Georgia,6 the Court held
that capital punishment is constitutional provided that the law imposing it sets forth sufficiently clear guidelines and procedures to
minimize capriciousness in sentencing. Gorecki, who sees Gregg as
a step in the counter-evolutionary direction, believes it to be the
product of a shift in public opinion that favors harsher punishments
in general and capital punishment in particular (pp. 105-13).
The villain behind Gregg, Gorecki contends, is our ineffective
criminal justice system, which he lambasted in A Theory of Criminal
Justice. A rising crime rate, which Gorecki attributes at least in part
to uncertainty of punishment and loss of respect for the law (pp. 10005), has produced a reaction of fear and anger. Gorecki does not
condemn these emotions (p. 107), but believes that they have led our
nation to focus on "the irrelevant themes of.punitive harshness and
capital punishment rather than the more important issues of certainty and justice" (p. 120).
Gorecki's solution, far easier to describe than to implement, is to
restructure our criminal justice system to make punishment more
certain and the administration of law more just (pp. 116-17). Capital
Punishment reiterates certain of the themes of A Theory of Criminal
Justice: for example, Gorecki once again raises the point that plea
bargaining introduces an undesirable element of arbitrariness into
the way that punishment is administered (pp. 103-05). To get a better idea of the magnitude of the changes Gorecki has in mind, however, an interested reader would be well advised to consult A Theory
of CriminalJustice in its entirety. Suffice to say that Gorecki's proposals are sweeping: police, prosecutorial and judicial discretion
4. P. 76 (quoting Bandura,,Analysi ofModeling Processes, in PSYCHOLOGICAL MODELING
51 (A. Bandura ed. 1971)).
5. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
6. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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should be curtailed, 7 the Miranda rule scrapped,3 and many laws rewritten or removed from the books. 9
Although Gorecki would no doubt prefer to be grouped among
"proponents of realistic legal change rather than [among] utopians in
the Stoic style" (p. 121), there is more than a touch of optimism in
his evaluation of the potential efficacy of the law as a means of moral
education. This is the scenario he envisions:
Granted that the reform of criminal justice stipulated here occurs,
what is the future of the death penalty? The reform will bring us closer
to the state where a just punishment follows every crime committed.
This will, in turn, bring, through the process of persuasive instrumental
learning, a sweeping decline in criminal behavior. With crime under
control, the anger and the fear of crime that pervade this society will
disappear. The anger and fear absent, the tendency toward declining
harshness of criminal punishments, then unopposed, will start working
again. This cannot but bring about a new growth of the abolitionist
sentiment ....

[P. 121].

One does not have to deny the value of certainty and evenhandedness in punishment to wonder whether instituting even the
best of legal systems in this country would, of itself, produce a
"sweeping decline in criminal behavior" (not to mention the difficulty of agreeing on what is the best system and implementing a
plan). Gorecki offers very little indeed in the way of empirical data
to support his view of the law's potential impact as moral teacher.
His review of history is not convincing evidence because, as he concedes, "it is impossible ex postfacto to trace motivations preventing
wrongdoing" (p. 75). All that remains is the weak conclusion that
"the limited information we have is not in the least inconsistent with
the idea of criminal law's reinforcing morality" (p. 75).
Gorecki's thesis does not stand or fall entirely on the basis of his
theory of the law as moral educator. What remains, however, seems
less than novel. It is not surprising to be told that western society has
tended to abandon harsher forms of corporal punishment (e.g., torture), at least in times of social stability and with respect to classes
considered equal by those exercising the power of punishment. The
predictive value of such an observation is limited, however. First,
one must assume (or hope), as Gorecki does, "that this society does
not face cultural decline in any predictable future" (p. 115). Second,

one must assume that the desire to spare criminals unnecessary pain
will prove stronger and more persistent than the desire to express
outrage through the use of capital punishment. History does not undermine this second assumption, but neither does it prove the as7. CRIMINAL JusTIcE, supra note 1, at 44-62, 103-09.

8. Id at 81-89, 118-26.
9. Id at 33-43, 95-101.
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sumption with the certainty that talk about an evolutionary trend
would indicate.' 0
CapitalPunishment does not contribute greatly to the already vo-

luminous discussion of the death penalty. Much of the book simply
recapitulates, often verbatim, the ideas of A Theory of CriminalJustice. What remains is the notion of an evolutionary trend toward

milder punishment, which is of questionable value as a predictive
tool. It is doubtful that the reader will learn more than he knew to

begin with: that the future of capital punishment in this country is
uncertain.

10. Though Gorecki at one point treats harshness as counterproductive, p. 76, he later
concedes that
[firom the standpoint of the effectiveness of criminal justice, this widely demanded severity [in the United States today] is harmless, and so are, in particular, capital convictions
and executions for a heinous crime. They are harmless for two reasons: first, and obviously so, they do not contribute to uncertainty of punishments, and second, by being
widely demanded, they are not perceived as unjust. On the other hand, they do not seem
useful either.
P. 119. If one de-emphasizes moral arguments against capital punishment, as Gorecki does,
and simply takes the stance of predicting its future, the neutral status of the death penalty in
efficiency terms may be offset by the fact that it satisfies the desires of a considerable part of
society for justice or revenge. These desires may persist indefinitely in a more powerful form
than the belief of other members of society that deliberately taking life is morally wrong. It
does not necessarily follow that because Western culture has tended to eschew physical cruelty,
it will eventually come to find any form of inflicting death unacceptable. One might conclude,
for example, as van den Haag does, that the reason for rejecting physical cruelty is because
"[c]orporal punishment is now perceived as debasing sexual exploitation." E. VAN DEN HAAG,
PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION 204 (1975). The
same may never be true of "sanitized" forms of capital punishment, particularly as the technology of killing with drugs develops.

